Spatialised Prisoner's Dilemma: Evolution Simulator

Welcome to Spatialised Prisoner's Dilemma Evolution Simulator. If you're unfamiliar with the game theory for Prisoners Dilemma please visit Iterated Prisoners Dilemma. for details. In this simulator the strategies are represented on a grid by colour code. Each cell is played against it's eight neighbouring cells iteratively and the scores averaged. Then cells are born by comparing the current mean scores of each cell with it's eight surrounding cells. The cell with the highest mean is replicated. Exception being cells born in the current generation, which are not overwritten. Mean values are initialised at the end of each generation. An option is provided to allows cells to persist for an unlimited period or die after 2 or 3 generations. An option is also provided for simulation rate. The Macroevolution rate is quicker and less process intensive. See the examples below for setting the strategies.

    Action at end of current generation:   Continue Stop  

Step how many generations:   1 2 5 10 50 100 1,000 10,000 (use the Stop radio button above to stop in-flight).

Stats by generation:
  Cell Mean Score Rounds Age Tempt. Punish Reward Sucker Begin
Processing cell: Births: Mutations: Generation:

Simulation rate:   Microevolution Macroevolution  

Cell longevity:   2 generations 3 generations Unlimited  

Strategy 1:   T= P= R= S= B=
Strategy 2:   T= P= R= S= B=

The strategy numerical values represent the probability of the strategy choosing co-operate for each of the four possible outcomes as well as for starting play. ie 1.0 meaning always co-operate and 0 meaning always defect. The possible outcomes are T (temptation), P (Punishment), R (Reward), S (Sucker) and B for how to begin play.

Colour Components

T = red, P = green, R = blue.
S = red dots. When S > 0.80 = :: or S > 0.60 = :. or S > 0.40 = : or S > 0.20 = . else no dots.


Always Co-operate:
T=1, P=1, R=1, S=1, B=1
white ::
Always Defect:
T=0, P=0, R=0, S=0, B=0
T=0.5, P=0.5, R=0.5, S=0.5, B=1 or 0
Tit for Tat:
T=1, P=0, R=1, S=0, B=1
T=0, P=1, R=1, S=0, B=1
Alternate Co-operate/Defect:
T=1, P=1, R=0, S=0, B=1
T=0, P=0, R=1, S=0, B=1

Copyright 1997 - 2024, Wayne Davis